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Reply to Commentary on “Transsubjectivity” 
 
DAVID HITCHCOCK 
Department of Philosophy 
McMaster University 
Hamilton, Ontario 
Canada 
hitchckd@mcmaster.ca 
 
1. Wohlrapp’s further exposition of his theory 
 
Harald Wohlrapp’s elaborations on the design of his theory, the role it postulates for subjectivity 
in argument and the nature of the principle of transsubjectivity should help the reader to 
understand better his significant reflection on our theorizing about the practice of argumentative 
discussion. 
 Readers may find difficult his use of the term ‘orientation’. Wohlrapp defines 
argumentative validity as a conclusion’s quality of being “suitable as a new orientation for 
action” (Wohlrapp 2014/2008, p. 270) in a domain in question. Thus, since the goal of 
argumentative discussion is in Wohlrapp’s view to determine if a thesis is valid, that goal 
amounts to determining if a thesis is suitable as a new orientation for action. In an earlier version 
of my paper, I glossed this goal as that of determining whether a thesis is suitable as a “guide” or 
“basis” for action. In correspondence, Wohlrapp expressed concern that an unprepared reader 
might understand this terminology in a narrow instrumentalist way. 
 
I had it, however, that a “valid” thesis is not only suitable “for action” but as well 
for further consideration, deliberation etc. in short: that it is (provisionally) 
included into our “orientation system”. (e-mail communication, 2016 05 29) 
 
Indeed, in two other places where the concept of the validity of a thesis is defined (Wohlrapp 
2014/2008, pp. lix, 132), the qualifier “for action” is omitted and validity is defined simply as 
suitability as a new orientation. In response to Wohlrapp’s concern, I replaced the phrases ‘guide 
for action’ and ‘basis for action’ with his term ‘orientation’ and quoted his (to me rather opaque) 
description of an orientation as a “theory that symbolically represents practically relevant 
distinctions, relationships, and regularities” (Wohlrapp 2014/2008, p. 108).  
 In correspondence, Wohlrapp said that he was aware that, although ‘Orientierung’ is 
commonly used in German-language argumentation theory, ‘orientation’ is not common in 
English-language argumentation theory. But William James, he discovered, uses it with 
Wohlrapp’s intended meaning, in an article which Wohlrapp cites (2014/2008, p. 5, n. 12) as a 
help to the English-speaking reader. James wrote: 
 
... the immediate self-transcendency affirmed as something existing independently 
of experiential mediation or termination .. could only result in our orientation, in 
the turning of our expectations and practical tendencies into the right path; and 
the right path here, so long as we and the object are not yet face to face (or can 
never get face to face, as in the case of ejects [sic]), would be the path that led us 
into the object’s nearest neighborhood. (James 1904, p. 563; italics added) 
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In further correspondence, Wohlrapp wrote that 
 
... turning our expectations and practical tendencies into the right path is a good 
characterization of it [orientation–DH] (where the “expectations” may concern 
anything about the issue and the “practical tendencies” may also refer to the 
practice of using words and building further theories). (e-mail communication, 
2016 05 30) 
 
For a full exposition of his concept of orientation, the reader should consult section 3.3 of 
Wohlrapp’s book, “The theoretical level: Orientation system.” 
 
2.  Is reasonable argumentation (quasi-)religious? 
 
There is much to be said for Wohlrapp’s understanding of both religion and the practice of 
argumentation as forms of cultivating deep trust. To participate seriously in argumentative 
discussion directed at reaching a conclusion that is suitable as a new orientation is indeed to 
manifest a faith in the power of human reason. But human reason is a slender reed on which to 
rely for our well-being. It is much less trustworthy than the care of an all-powerful and loving 
God (if there is one). If there is no such god, then we human beings have less reason to trust that 
things are good and right. 
 The practice of reasonable argumentation, I claimed, contains neither a promise of 
personal salvation nor rituals marking the significant transitions in one’s life. Wohlrapp finds, at 
the suggestion of Katharina Stevens, a kind of analogue of personal salvation in my discharge 
from personal responsibility if I strive for theses that are free from open objections. He concedes 
the present lack of rituals, but supposes that there might be rituals if there was more respect for 
the practice of argumentation. Any such rituals, however, would not be rituals celebrating the 
crucial events in the life of an individual person. And the mentioned analogue of personal 
salvation is hardly the supreme bliss promised by traditional religions. The common feature of 
the two disanalogies between religion and argumentation is that the trust in human reason that 
reasonable argumentation reflects is not a trust that things are good and right for me, but a trust 
that things are good and right in general, i.e. for us human beings who participate in the practice. 
Secular human beings can still believe in “humanity’s spiritual and ethical potential” (Wohlrapp 
2014, p. 394), but may not be able to actualize this potential to the same extent as adherents to 
traditional religions think they can.  
 Further, as Wohlrapp may well agree, it is not only in reasonable argumentation that 
secular humanity can realize its spiritual and ethical potential. It can do so as well, and perhaps 
to a greater extent, in the care that one human being has for others, whether they are near and 
dear to one or they are strangers whose plight moves one to helpful action. 
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